

Workers' motivations and managerial practices in not-for-profit social enterprises

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Abstract

The literature has always pointed out that social enterprise (SE) worker have a specific motivational profile compared to their counterparts in for-profit organizations (FPOs). Usually, SE workers have been identified as being intrinsically motivated. Nevertheless, the interpretation of what covers intrinsic motivation remains ambiguous in the literature on SEs. Hence, the first objective of this article is to use both economic and psychological literature in order to understand the exact nature of motivation to work for an SE. We propose that rather than considering the motivation to work in SEs as intrinsic, it should be considered as prosocial. Further, the self-determination theory allows for the understanding that prosocial motivation may be based on different types of extrinsic regulation (introjected – identified – integrated) but not on intrinsic motivation. The second aim of this article is to propose a discussion on managerial practices related to this new conceptualization. In particular, we discuss the practices that SEs might use, on the one hand, to attract and select workers who are motivated by their social mission, and on the other hand, to sustain and favor their employees' motivation over time.

Keywords: Social enterprise, Prosocial Motivation, Extrinsic and intrinsic regulations, Incentives.

1. Introduction

Nowadays, social enterprises (SEs)¹ are often led into competition with for-profit organizations (notably by the emergence of quasi-markets in the social services industries). However, SEs suffer from several competitive disadvantages. For instance, the attenuation of property rights in SEs creates difficulties in attracting resources from profit-seeking investors. In addition, some authors have highlighted a lack or weaknesses in incentive mechanisms in SE governance created by the absence of traditional shareholders (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Nevertheless, the limitation constraint in profit distribution between shareholders could be a way to attract non-market resources as donations and grants (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and to be seen as more trustworthy by clients in situations of information asymmetry with regards to the quality of goods and services (e.g., Hirt, 1999; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Weisbrod, 1988). Moreover, the competitive disadvantages of SEs may be also counterbalanced by their capacity to employ workers with larger ideological motivations (e.g., Mosca, Musella & Pastore, 2007), who are not predominantly motivated by monetary remuneration (e.g., Bacchiega & Borzaga, 2001) and who are ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to work towards a social mission in which they believe (e.g., Preston, 1989). SEs would thus be able, if necessary, to offer lower wages than for-profit organizations (FPOs). This possible cut in labor costs constitutes the main strength of SEs in order to be competitive in a market (e.g., Steinberg, 1990; Valentinov, 2007). In addition, both SEs and their workers are mission oriented; this may lead to a match between the organization and its workers' values and goals, which in turn lead to higher efforts and outputs from SE workers, and then economizes on the need for high-powered incentives (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005). In consequence, it is of primary importance for SEs to understand why and by what their workers are motivated in order to develop a work environment that best suits the particular motivational profile of their workforce. This would allow SEs to attract ideologically minded workers who best match the organization's mission and to maintain high levels of motivation over time.

¹ The concepts used to describe organizations with social mission vary from one country to another: "économie sociale et solidaire" in France; "économie sociale" and "entreprise à profit social" in Belgium; "non-profit sector" in the US, "voluntary sector" in the UK, etc. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, most scientists who are rooted in the European tradition consider the "third sector" to include not only non-profit organizations (associations) but also cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and even new forms of social enterprises or, in other words, all organizations whose primary purpose is not profit maximization for shareholders. Given that the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the underlying issues with these different concepts, we made the choice to use the generic term of "social enterprise" (SE). For this research, we then define social enterprise as not-for-profit organizations that combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to provide goods or services with the primacy of their social aims.

The literature usually identifies SE workers as intrinsically motivated. According to psychologist researchers, intrinsic motivation refers to performing activities for their own sake, because they are inherently found to be interesting. However, the interpretation of what covers intrinsic motivation remains ambiguous in the literature on SEs. Indeed, most authors agree on the fact that SE workers are not only motivated by a task that is inherently interesting and satisfying; they also care about the social impact of their job. The ambiguity of intrinsic motivation comes from the fact that research on motivation in SE generally confuse (and does not clearly define) the content and the regulation of motivation. Recently, new research that is being developed at the crossroads of psychology and economics provides new insights about the motivation to work in SEs. These studies point out that the motivation to work in SEs is not intrinsically but extrinsically regulated, and that the content of SE workers' motivation is prosocial. In others words, SE workers are considered to be more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs. Considering these approaches towards work motivation in SE is a crucial issue since earlier studies, which only dichotomously conceptualize intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation, lead to misinterpretation in the transposition of psychological theories (De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011), and implications for management remain ambiguous. For instance, the main recommendation in the literature about the practices to implement in order to encourage work motivation in SEs concerns job characteristics like autonomy or task variety (e.g. Frey, 1997). However, these practices (even if they may have a positive impact on the pleasure to perform the task) are not directly related on the workers' prosocial motivation.

Therefore, we structure our theoretical contribution according two main objectives. The first aim is to use both economic and psychological literature to make the point and to understand what exactly the motivation to work for an SE covers. We describe the content of SE workers' motivations by referring mainly to the works of De Cooman et al. (2011), Devaro & Brookshire (2007), Francois (2007), Francois & Vlassopoulos (2008), and Grant (2008), the regulation of the SE workers motivation based on the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), and the path through which workers are attracted to SEs thanks to the person-environment fit theory (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Edwards, 2008; Kristof, 1996). Once the motivation specificities to work in an SE are clearly identified, this chapter proposes to discuss the implications on managerial practices related to this new conceptualization. In particular, we discuss the practices that SEs might use to select workers motivated by the organization's social mission, and to sustain and nurture their motivation over time.

2. From Intrinsic Motivation to Prosocial Motivation: The Content of the Motivation or for “What” People are Working

A major determinant of the motivation is the “what” or the content of the goal that directs actions (Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste & De Witte, 2008). Goals determine the objectives to reach and are set by the environment or the individual, and their intensity partially predicts the level of the outcome (Locke & Latham, 2002). In order to investigate the content of the motivation of SEs workers, economists have been inspired by the literature in the field of psychology, which distinguishes extrinsic motivation from intrinsic motivation. An activity that is performed to obtain a positive outcome (e.g. wage) or for the avoidance of negative consequences (e.g. to lose his job) is said to be extrinsically motivated. Conversely, an activity that is performed for its own sake, because it is inherently interesting, is said to be intrinsically motivated (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Frey 2000). Since these authors consider that SE workers have less motivation to work for monetary rewards (Bacchiega & Borzaga, 2001), which they define as “extrinsic”, than their counterparts in FPOs, they have conclude that the motivation to work in SEs would be intrinsic (e.g., Crewson, 1997; Theuvsen, 2004). Nevertheless, this dichotomous approach of motivation is not able to explain with enough precision workers’ behaviors (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000), especially in an SE context (De Cooman et al., 2011; Grant, 2007). This lack of precision has led to misinterpretation and to an absence of consensus about what the “intrinsic motivation” shared by SE workers covers.

The main popular interpretations of what might be the intrinsic motivation of SE workers come from Hansmann (1980), Preston (1989), and Rose-Ackerman (1996). First, Hansmann (1980) described those who are attracted to SEs as people who are motivated by the production of quality services. A very closed interpretation of this is given by Leete (2006) who suggests that SE employees are involved in providing goods and services in which they find intrinsic value. Secondly, Preston (1989) sees SE workers as being intrinsically motivated by the production of collective goods for the whole of society. This is similar to the definition given by Lanfranchi and Narcy (2008) who argue that SE workers choose their job because they judge it as socially useful or because they want to perform acts of generosity towards others. In the same vein, Frank (1996) considers SE employees as more intrinsically motivated by the social responsibility of their employment (i.e. SE workers want to perform work that is more morally palatable) and Mosca, Musella & Pastore (2007) describe SE workers as being “ideologically minded individuals”. A third main interpretation

is given by Rose-Ackerman (1996) who suggests that SE workers are motivated to work in organizations that give them the opportunity to promote their values and ideas. Indeed, following several authors (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Callen & Falk, 1993; Handy & Katz, 1998), job applicants who must choose between an FPO and an SE tend to choose the SE when its mission corresponds to their own values and goals. Finally, other authors have tried to combine these “different schools of thought” in an integrated definition, such as Benz (2005, p. 156) who sees SE workers as, “*intrinsically motivated by a desire to produce a quality service, to promote the ideas or the vision of the non-profit’s mission , or to assist in the production of a public good they see as desirable for society at large (...) they are seen to enjoy satisfaction from the work and the work context itself*”.

Hence, existing studies do not agree on the definition of what the motivation to work in SEs consists of. Nevertheless, most authors agree on the fact that SE workers are not only motivated by performing a task that is inherently interesting and satisfying, but that they also care about the social impact of their job. Indeed, all others things being equal, SEs workers have no reason to be more motivated by the nature of the task than FPOs workers doing the same task. In other words, the nature of the task cannot explain these differences of motivation between SEs and FPOs workers, all others things being equal. This is the high social significance of working in SEs (due to their social mission) that explain the differences observed between the motivation of workers in SEs and those in FPOs. . In an attempt to clarify this confusion, Devaro and Brookshire (2007) recently made a distinction between intrinsic motivation derived from the task/the job for itself (I play tennis because I like to do so) and intrinsic motivation derived from the intended mission/objective of the job (I make lot of effort because I believe that my work is socially useful). They suggest a priori that compared to FPOs workers; SEs workers have more intrinsic motivation of the second type, provided that the organization’s mission fits the worker’s value system. In particular, SEs workers would be specifically more motivated to fulfill the social mission which corresponds to provide goods and services in helping others. Then, the content of SEs workers’ motivation is not to be intrinsic but rather to be oriented in helping others. According to social psychologists, this desire to benefit or to make a positive difference in other people’s lives defines the content of the prosocial motivation (e.g., Grant, 2008; Lewis, 2010; Tschirhart, Reed, Freeman, & Anker, 2008). Prosocial motivation refers to the willingness to help the others by making a difference (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Tschirhart, Reed, Freeman, & Anker, 2008). SE workers may then be considered as more pro-socially motivated than FPOs workers, all

others things being equal (De Cooman et al., 2011; Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008). Besides the argument that SE workers care about social impact, many of abovementioned arguments also highlight the importance for them to perceive a fit between their values and goals and those of the organization. This concept of person-organization fit and its importance in workers' attraction and motivation are presented and discussed in the fourth section of this paper.

As first conclusion, we provide arguments that lead us to clearly define the specific content (i.e. the purpose of individuals' actions) of workers' motivations in SEs as being prosocial. However, we still need to discuss and define the regulation of prosocial motivation. In order to further clarify the nature and the process of workers' motivations in SE, we will then describe the regulation process based on the self-determination theory, and next clarify the type of regulation involved in prosocial motivation.

3. The regulation of the motivation or “why” people are motivated: Is prosocial motivation intrinsically or extrinsically regulated?


Regulation of motivation

Beyond defining for “what” people act, the self-determination theory (SDT) aims to define “why” people are motivated to do what they do. Indeed, the level of the outcome depends not only on the strength of the “what” of the motivation, but also on the “why” or the “quality” of this motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste & De Witte, 2008). In other words, by defining the “why” of the motivation, SDT describes the process of the regulation of the motivation. The regulation of the motivation corresponds to the interplay between internal (i.e. from the individual) and external forces (i.e. from the environment) that guide how individuals deal with their goals.

The first claim of SDT is that motivated behaviors are either intrinsically or extrinsically regulated. However, SDT suggests that extrinsic motivation can be subdivided into four components (external, introjected, identified and integrated), which differ from each other in terms of how contextual and environmental norms, values and pressures are internalized by individuals. The four types of extrinsic regulations then align along a continuum according to the degree of internalization of the causality of their work behavior (see Figure 1). In other words, they rank according to the extent to which the regulation of behavior is internalized and the extent to which the reason or purpose of an activity is

absorbed into the inner self (Ryan & Connell 1989). If the behavior is not really internalized, the motivation is described as controlled (engage in an activity because it allows one to achieve a desired result or to avoid punishment or feelings of guilt); if it is highly internalized, the motivation is considered as autonomous (engage in an activity on a voluntary basis or with the feeling of having the choice). In general, autonomous motivations have been shown to lead to positive consequences ranging from the quality and quantity of the work done (performance, effort, commitment) to an employee’s own well-being (satisfaction, organizational trust). On the other hand, controlled motivations are supposed to impair psychological functioning (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005). Hence, the positive effect of motivation on individual behavior would not only depend on the intensity of the motivation but also on how this motivation is regulated.

Figure 1 - The Self-Determination Theory



Source: Deci & Ryan (2008, p. 17).
 The types of regulation according to self-determination theory.

External and introjected regulations are considered as controlled motivation. External motivation exists when behaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand, to receive a reward that is contingent to the behavior, or to avoid punishment. Externally regulated behavior is very much what one would expect to see arise from deskilled jobs (Tremblay, Blanchard, Taylor, Pelletier, & Villeneuve, 2009). Introjected motivation appears when people behave in a manner that is socially accepted in order to feel respected by others and/or to avoid feelings of guilt or anxiety. Such controlled motivations are clearly not based on personal reasons, but more on a desire to get rewards by adopting behaviors that are externally valorized. In contrast with controlled motivations, identified regulation, integrated regulation and intrinsic regulation are seen more as autonomous motivation. Identified

regulation corresponds to an identification of the importance of external (e.g. organizational) goals and values. Integrated regulation corresponds to a perfect fit between the individual's goals and values and those of his/her environment (e.g. organization). In this second type of regulation, values that guide the action are accepted and integrated in one's self-concept, i.e. they are considered as an integral part of who one is and one's personal goals. Finally, according to the SDT, intrinsic motivation corresponds to engaging in an activity for its own sake, because it is intrinsically interesting and enjoyable. Applying the SDT in a work context allow to understanding that controlled and autonomous extrinsic regulations emerge from a varying degree of (mis)fit between a worker's values or goals and organizational values or goals (i.e. mission) that are independent of the intrinsic regulation that has to do with the pleasure of performing the task and which is always autonomously regulated.

Regulation of prosocial motivation

Following the above demonstration and in accordance with the work conducted by some authors (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011; Grant, 2008; Speckbacher, 2013), we do not consider anymore the prosocial motivation as intrinsically regulated but rather as a state of identified or integrated regulation or even introjected regulation². Indeed, as Grant (2008) explains, pro-socially motivated workers are not doing task for the pleasure they get while doing it, but as a means to fulfill their core values in attaining their prosocial goals³. It implies also that a prosocial motivation is future-oriented and based on long-term goals, whereas intrinsic motivation is present-oriented and based on having an enjoyable experience while performing the task. Hence, workers could have a prosocial motivation, and an experience related to the task level that is pleasant or not. According to Burton et al. (2006), Grant (2008), and Speckbacher (2013), pro-socially motivated workers may even perform work that they perceive as involving painful effort, drawbacks or frustration, while intrinsically motivated workers feel naturally drawn towards completing their work. This new interpretation of the regulation of prosocial motivation is of great importance to SEs since the motivation of their workers will then no longer be perceived as being intrinsically regulated, but rather as being extrinsically regulated.

² The external regulation of the prosocial motivation depends on the fit or the misfit between workers and organization's values. Hence, prosocial motivation has an introjected regulation when workers' values are not aligned with the prosocial values of their organization and an integrated regulation when values aligned perfectly. .

³ or the goals of their organization when the motivation has an introjected regulation.

In this section, we have demonstrated that prosocial motivation is more an identified, integrated or even an introjected form (i.e. autonomous) of extrinsic regulation than a form of intrinsic motivation. Making this distinction between intrinsic motivation and prosocial motivation which is based on extrinsic regulation may have important consequences for managerial practices and incentives (e.g., Burton, Lydon, D'Alessandro, & Koestner, 2006; De Cooman et al., 2011; Günter, 2015), which we discuss in the next sections of this article.

A first important consequence is that an autonomous extrinsic regulation is the most efficient form of regulation of prosocial motivation. Extrinsic regulation is highly autonomous when workers' values and mission are strongly aligned. This highlights the importance of developing and sustaining a high level of fit between an employee's and the organization's values to favor autonomous prosocial motivation for SEs (while PO fit has no direct effect on intrinsic motivation that is only determined at the task level⁴). Hence, before we discuss what practices and incentives SEs may be used to positively influence the autonomous prosocial motivation of their workforce, we describe in the next section the work values theory and the importance of value congruency through the concept of person-environment fit. Using the same concept, we define conditions of compatibility between individual preferences and the type of job provided that lead to prosocial motivation. Finally, we highlight the importance of both person-environment fit at the job level and at the organizational level to attract prosocially motivated workers in SEs.

4. Person-environment fit or how SE might attract and select the “right” worker

The concept of person-environment fit (PE fit) applied at work (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Kristof, 1996; Lewin, 1951; Schneider, 1987) refers to the congruence, match, or similarity between people and their environments (Edwards, 2008). PE fit in industrial and organizational studies is most often conceived through person-organization fit (PO fit) and person-job fit (PJ fit).

Person-organization fit

Person-organization fit is the congruence between workers and organizational values (Chatman, 1989; Edwards & Cable, 2009; Kristof, 1996). In this stream of research, values

⁴ Intrinsic motivation is only determined at the task level.

are defined as beliefs through which a specific mode of conduct is considered as preferable to its opposite (Chatman, 1989; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). It is important to consider work values because they guide individuals in their job search (Ros, Schwartz, & Surkiss, 1999). More precisely, people want to work for an organization with norms and values that fit with their own work values (Judge & Bretz, 1992; Maierhofer, Kabanoff, & Griffin, 2002).

Prosocial motivation is related to altruistic values⁵, such as concern for others (De Dreu, 2006; Grant, 2007; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004; Schwartz, 1992), empathy and helpfulness (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). Hence, pro-socially motivated workers give more importance into their altruistic values than workers with self-interested motivations (McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004; Penner, Midili, & Kegelmeyer, 1997; Rioux & Penner, 2001). We are not postulating that prosocially motivated workers—more specifically, SE employees—should only have altruistic values or that they cannot give importance to finding a job that they like to perform, but rather that their specificity, compared to their counterparts in FPOs, is to give more importance to their altruistic values.

Therefore, if some job applicants prefer to work for an organization with a social mission than in an FPO, it is mainly because they have altruistic values that match with the organization's values and goals. In other words, SEs are perceived as organizations that could, potentially, attract pro-socially motivated workers because such workers have values that fit with the organization's mission and values (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Francois, 2000, 2007; Steinberg, 1990; Young, 1983). A second reason that explains why SEs are more likely to attract such workers than FPOs is due to their principle of profit distribution limitation among shareholders (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999). Indeed, this constraint works as a signal of trust and gives more insurance that the workers' efforts will increase the quality or the quantity of the services and not be turned into the owner's profit (e.g., Francois, 2003, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008; Leete, 2006). In conclusion, pro-socially motivated workers are attracted to SEs because they place great importance on their altruistic values when they look for a job, while SEs offer a workplace

⁵ Different hypotheses have been studied regarding origins of the prosocial motivation (Batson et al., 2008; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Meier, 2006). Formerly altruistic values that drive prosocial motivation may be conceptualized as "pure." However, Andreoni (1990) introduced the idea of impure altruism. Hence, if the purest form of prosocial behavior are motivated by altruism, he can also be based on a more "selfish interest". Indeed, Grant (2008, p. 406) highlights that « *altruistic and egoistic motives may be complementary in the process of making a prosocial difference, as employees face opportunities to benefit not only others but also themselves through constructing valued relationships and identities.* » At least people acting pro-socially would enhance or protect their self- and social identity (Batson et al., 2008). In this thesis, we suggest that a prosocial motivation based on pure altruistic values would be more autonomous than a prosocial motivation based on impure altruistic values.

where people have a stronger possibility to contribute to the public interest and to attain their prosocial goals (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008)⁶.

These results highlight the importance for SEs to provide accurate information about their mission and values in order to ensure the attraction of pro-socially motivated workers who fit with their mission. Researchers highlight that information sharing about organizational values (Cable, Aiman-Smith, Mulvey, & Edwards, 2000) and job roles (Wanous & Colella, 1989) with applicants occurs in the early stages of contact between workers and the organization, particularly during the recruitment and selection processes (Cable & Yu, 2007). In particular, the development of workers' perception of fit with the organization starts during the recruitment process (Cable & Judge, 1996; Judge & Bretz, 1992; Judge & Cable, 1997) corresponding to the information provided by the organization to attract new employees that fit the best with their social mission (Barber, 1998; Breaugh & Starke, 2000).

Person-Job Fit

Beyond PO fit, we highlight the concept of person-job fit (PJ fit). PJ fit is usually studied through the needs-supplies fit and demands-abilities fit (Edwards, 2008; Kristof, 1996; Muchinsky & Monahan, 1987). Needs-supplies fit refers to the degree to which an individual's needs or expectations are fulfilled by supplies in the environment (French, Caplan & Harrison, 1984; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005). Demands-abilities fit refers to the degree to which environmental demands are fulfilled by an individual's capabilities (French et al., 1984; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005).

Workers' expectations and needs concern the wage but not only (e.g., Lazear & Shaw, 2007). Jobs are composed of a bundle of both monetary and non-monetary characteristics and, the non-monetary characteristics of a job might even be as much important as the remuneration for many workers (Leete, 2006). PJ fit is related to job characteristics on the one hand, and working conditions on the other hand. Job characteristics correspond to the characteristics of the task performed (autonomy, creativity and variability of the task, task significance, required physical effort, etc.) and characteristics of the physical and social

⁶ Empirical proofs are notably given by Lyons et al. (2006) who found that not-for-profit workers place more value than FPO workers on contributing to society. De Cooman et al. (2011) also found in a study of 13 service Belgian organizations that SE employees are more concerned about altruism and perceived a higher PO fit than FPO employees.

environment within the task is performed. Working conditions cover the contractual relationship between the employer and the employees (wages, type of contract, working hours, etc.). This distinction is crucial for conceptualizing the effects of PJ fit on outcomes (Edwards & Shipp, 2007). While PJ fit at every level leads to better job satisfaction, only PJ fit that is related to job characteristics (mainly to task characteristics) lead to higher intrinsic motivation (Lawler & Hall, 1970). We might also suppose that only PJ fit related to task significance leads in a direct way to more prosocial motivation. Indeed, task significance is defined as the degree to which an employee's work affects directly the health and well-being of other people and contributes to work motivation by enabling employees to experience their work as meaningful (e.g., Fried & Ferris, 1987; Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Katz, 1978). Research conducted by Grant (2007) confirms this idea by showing that the perceived impact of one's work on the others is an important psychological state to see prosocial motivation emerges.

The concept of PJ fit highlights that the workers' preference related to the job also guide individuals in their job search. People choose to work for an organization that provides them the job which fits the best with their preferences. The challenge for any kind of enterprise is then to attract workers by offering them a job that answers to their preferences. Hence, SEs should offer working conditions and job characteristics adapted to the preferences of pro-socially motivated workers in order to attract them and favor a high level of satisfaction. Person-job fit related to task significance seems particularly important to attract workers who are pro-socially motivated. Borzaga & Tortia (2006) confirm that the nature of the task is highly related to job satisfaction in SEs. Beyond task significance, some previous empirical studies give us indications about the preferences of SE workers. If they first see their work as a way to earn a living and to support their families; they give less importance to wages and career opportunities, and attribute a higher importance to the non-monetary aspects of the job than average workers (e.g., Borzaga & Tortia, 2006; Lyons, Duxburry & Higgins, 2006). In fact, they want to find a job that is fulfilling to them at both a personal and a relational level (Lyons, Duxburry & Higgins, 2006).

A priori and all others things being equal, there is no better PJ fit in SEs than in FPOs for pro-socially motivated workers. However, value congruence may have a positive impact on PJ fit (Edwards & Shipp, 2007). Indeed, according to Devaro & Brookshire (2007, p.331) *"... a positive social mission would naturally increase the 'task significance' of a job. Thus, even when tasks are identical in a given job in two different organizations, if one organization*

has a positive social mission and the other does not, task significance should be higher in the organization with the positive mission.” Hence, being pro-socially motivated by a social mission that fits one’s value-based system has a positive effect on PJ fit by increasing task significance. Moreover, value congruence could positively impact demands–abilities fit at the task level because it fosters communication and coordination (Adkins, Ravlin & Meglino, 1996), which increase people’s abilities to fulfill demands (Motowidlo, 2003). Hence, the better congruence in altruistic values observed in SE workers may lead to a better PJ fit in SEs than in FPOs.

Person-environment fit, job satisfaction and the labor donation theory

Taking into account the literature on the person-environment fit concept may help to better understand the dynamical and complex relationship between workers and their occupations. First, it highlights that workers have a broader set of preferences and values than what is usually considered by Economics. Indeed, workers have others preferences than their own leisure and consumption as it might be mentioned by the “homo economicus” abstraction. In addition, workers should not be considered as exclusively selfish anymore. It is then important that organizations (in particular SE) take into account that workers have complex expectations that include the willingness to help the others and acting morally (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2000). Second, it allows for understanding how workers are attracted by particular organizations and how perceived fit may play an important role in defining the content and the regulation of their motivation related to their job.

In order to summarize all these important implications by referring to the concept of person-environment fit, we use an adapted version of the utility function develop by Lanfranchi & Narcy (2008). The utility of an employee i to work in organization j depends on the following factors:

$$U_{i,j} = U(X_i, Y_{i,j}, E_{i,j}, V_{i,j}, Z_{i,j})$$

where X_i are individual characteristics of the workers i , $Y_{i,j}$ represents the working conditions related to the contractual relationship with the employer $E_{i,j}$ and the characteristics of the task to perform, $V_{i,j}$ represents the physical and social environment within which the task is performed, and finally $Z_{i,j}$ represents the opportunity for the worker to contribute to the public interest. The variable X_i highlights that the expectations about each of these components vary between individuals. For instance, workers attracted to SEs should give

more importance to the opportunity to contribute to the society and less importance to monetary rewards than their counterparts in FPOs. Hence, a worker would be attracted by a job offer that fit the best with its expectations. All the components of the utility function are related to PJ fit (and then to job satisfaction) but, as previously mentioned, only a perceived fit in job characteristics ($E_{i,j}$ and $V_{i,j}$) has a positive effect on intrinsic motivation. A worker would be considered as pro-socially motivated by their job if they derive a strictly positive utility from the variable $Z_{i,j}$ (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008). This would be the case if they either perceive a fit between their altruistic values and the organization's values or if they perceive (and valorize) that their task is inherently significant, or both. Hence, this utility function highlights that SE workers would derive satisfaction from working for a social mission in which they believe (Rawls, Ullrich, and Nelson, 1975; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005; Verquer, Beehr, & Wagner, 2003). In other words, by supporting SEs, workers derive nonpecuniary utility from being able to act in accordance with their altruistic values and beliefs (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008; Valentinov, 2007). According to this argument, several authors (e.g., Frank, 1996; Leete, 2000) postulate that workers being in an SE would be more satisfied in their job than their counterparts in a FPO, all others factors being equal, provided that the SE's mission fits their value system. More formally, for two workers i and k we can write:

$$\text{If } Z_{i,SE} > Z_{k,FPO}$$

$$\text{and } X_{i,SE} = X_{k,FPO}, Y_{i,SE} = Y_{k,FPO}, E_{i,SE} = E_{k,FPO}$$

$$\text{then } U_{i,SE} > U_{k,FPO}$$

Empirical literature has usually confirmed that SE workers are more satisfied than their counterparts in FPOs, all others things being equal, even at a lower wage level (e.g., Benz, 2005; Light, 2002; Mirvis, 1992). Further, the labor donation theory (Preston, 1989) highlights that if SE worker are more satisfied, all others things being equal, they would be ready to sacrifice potential higher wages or benefits elsewhere to work within an organization that supports values aligned with their own (Cheverton, 2007). In others words, SE workers (especially managers and professionals) would be ready to work for lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs (e.g., Preston, 1989, 1990; Rose-Ackerman,1996) because they find that working for a social mission in SEs is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working in FPOs (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Light 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). According to the

labor donation theory, SEs enterprises have then the possibility to offer lower wages than FPOs⁷. More formally, if $X_{i,SE} = X_{i,FPO}$, $E_{i,SE} = E_{k,FPO}$ and $Z_{i,SE} > Z_{i,FPO}$ then SEs have the opportunity to offer less attractive wages than FPOs ($Y_{i,SE} < Y_{i,FPO}$), and at the same time, attracting similar skilled workers if the following condition is still fulfilled: $U_{i,SE} \geq U_{i,FPO}$.

On the basis of the labor donation theory, Handy and Katz (1998) suggest then that one solution for SEs to select workers who best match the organization's mission is to offer lower wages because only those kind of workers would be ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to satisfy their prosocial motivation (adverse selection mechanism). Hence, if SEs offer lower wages than others types of organizations, highly pro-socially motivated workers will self-select themselves in SEs that best fit their altruistic values, while people who value more pay will seek employment in the for-profit sector (Lewis & Frank, 2002). To conclude, paying lower wages increases SEs' output by generating a negative adverse selection mechanism (Handy & Katz, 1998; Hansmann, 1980) and ensuring a higher probability to select workers that will put efforts through their values and duty fulfillment (e.g., Akerlof & Yellen 1990).

The SEs opportunity to attract workers who experience more job satisfaction than their counterparts in FPOs and who are ready to "donate" labor to work for a mission in which they believe is seen as one of the greatest strengths of the sector. However, this also introduces the challenge to develop a work environment that retains and motivates SE workers (Becker, Antuar & Everett, 2011). It is certainly not enough to correctly select people who present the best fit regarding values in order to obtain the highest motivation and performance at work; it is also important to maintain and favor the intensity of prosocial motivation and its autonomous character in their careers in those organizations. Hence, due to their specific contextual and economic constraints, SE managers are facing to considerable managerial challenges in order to develop and maintain the highest motivation and performance of their employees.

⁷ The empirical literature is divided over the presence of lower wages in social enterprises. Indeed, if some empirical works validate this assumption (Frank, 1996; Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 1983), the studies conducted by Devaro & Brookshire (2007), Leete (2000), Ben-Ner, Ren & Paulson (2011), and Ruhm & Borkoski (2003) could not prove the existence of a "wage penalty" to the detriment of workers being in social enterprises and Mocan & Teikin (2003) surprisingly found that social enterprises offered higher wages in the area of child care. These contradictory empirical results may have some theoretical explanations. Indeed, if social enterprises have legitimate reasons to offer lower wages, the theory of property rights predicts that social enterprises will pay higher wages than the for-profit sector (Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008). According to this theory, the attenuation of property rights faced by social enterprises, due to their limitation in profit distribution leads to transform surpluses in the form of higher wages, according to a charitable or philanthropic act (Feldstein, 1971).

5. What incentives should SEs implement?

Agency theory and pay-for-performance incentives

The necessity to implement managerial practices that sustain and develop workers' motivation aligned with the organizational mission is highlighted by the agency theory (Ross, 1973). An agent acts or works for the principal in a particular domain of decisions problems and then affects its utility, while the principal and agent are assumed to have conflicting interest. Principal-agent dilemma causes inefficient and poor performances in organizations in case of asymmetric information, i.e. when an agent undertakes to perform an action on behalf of a principal while the final result of the action depends on a parameter known to the agent but not to the principal. In other words, if workers are not fully monitored by the principal(s), they may decide to adopt opportunistic behaviors (e.g., given a lower level of effort or to deviate from the behavior expected by the principal). Hence, any type of enterprise must ensure that its workers adopt consistent behavior with its mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006), either by controlling or by encouraging their efforts. However, a total control of workers' behavior may be very costly—and often not possible—and would render delegation meaningless (Speckbacher, 2013). Another solution is to develop incentives structures that motivate workers to give a maximum effort and to adopt a coherent behavior with the organization's mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2009; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006). Pay-for-performance is the most well-known (and predominant in FPOs) type of incentive. It means that the agent (worker) remuneration would depend (partially) on the value of the outcome for the principal (Prendergast, 1999). Performance-based compensation allows for aligning agents' behavior with organizational objectives while increasing their efforts, which in turn increases productivity (Lazear, 2000; Speckbacher, 2013). However, if pay-for-performance seems to have a lot of advantages, the means through which it is achieved may be revealed as very complex (Becker, Antuar & Everett, 2011). Francois (2007, p. 729) argues that *“It is likely that many organizations do not use performance-related compensation because it is costly, difficult to implement, and perhaps even infeasible.”*

Should SEs use pay-for-performance incentives?

For any kind of organization, the main conditions to be able to implement efficient pay-for-performance incentives is to have knowledge of relevant goals and to be able to formulate specific expectations towards workers, on the one hand, and to be able to observe and

measure the worker's outcomes on the other hand (Gibbons, 1998; Kerr 1975). Those conditions are not usually met in SEs and making the link between mission and measure is a priori a critical issue (Kaplan, 2001). Indeed, it is hard to transform the SE's aim to provide collective goods into a quantifiable goal because such goals tend to be multiple, multidimensional, ambiguous and less tangible than profit maximization (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011; Speckbacher, 2013; Theuvsen, 2004). In that case, establishing a quantifiable measure to reward performance can induce the distortion of the incentives by an excessive attention given to this quantifiable objective and an overemphasis on highly visible behaviors (Gibbons, 1998; Kerr 1975). For instance, the focuses of SE to provide quality services may be avoided by introducing a pay-for-performance system based on a quantifiable measure of worker outcomes by redirecting the worker's effort towards the delivery of a maximum quantity of services and not on the quality of services (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014)⁸.

Besides the fact that SEs are usually not able to implement a coherent system of incentives based on worker performance, such incentives seem to be not favorable in an SE context. Indeed, several theories highlight that pay-for-performance incentives negatively affect the workers' autonomous prosocial motivation. First, the introduction of the pay-for-performance incentives in SE possibly transforms loyal employees into income maximizing ones by displacing the content of their motivation. Hence, introduction of pay-for-performance incentives crowd-outs the workers' prosocial motivation (François & Vlassopoulos, 2008). Benabou and Tirole (2006) underline this prediction by highlighting that the use of monetary incentives can trigger doubts about the altruistic reason for performing a task. Second, the cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) puts forward that incentives that are perceived as controls negatively affect the worker's autonomy, which in turn reduces or eliminates the autonomous regulation of their motivation. Hence, introducing coercive and constraining incentives as pay-for-performance impairs self-determination because the locus of control shifts from inside to outside the worker (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Valentinov, 2007). Third, SE workers are supposed to share (or to be motivated by) values and norms defended through the mission of their organization. Hence, whereas economic relationships developed in FPOs depend directly on payment, social relationships developed in SEs are more shaped by altruism and social concerns (Mosca, Musella & Pastore, 2007). In

⁸ For example, offering doctors rewards related to the number of people they have treated in a given amount of time can motivate them to focus on the rewarded aspects of performance while cheating on quality, which is not contractible (Speckbacher, 2013).

consequence, the relationship between SEs and their workers has a trust-based nature that calls for a more trust-based style of control than a pay-for-performance type of incentive (Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Speckbacher, 2013).

In conclusion, it seems like SEs have no interest in using the incentive structures that are traditionally implemented in FPOs. Indeed, this literature review strongly emphasizes arguments against the use of pay-for-performance system in SEs, notably because the nature of their mission requires workers who are more motivated by social objectives than by monetary rewards (e.g., Hansmann, 1980; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). However, Theuvsen (2004) points out that it is not reasonable to automatically apply these assumptions for all SEs due to the diverse and changing environmental conditions of the SE sector (Parsons & Broadbridge, 2004). For example, an SE that is not able to attract adequate workers who identify themselves with the organization's mission and who relies mainly on market resources may reasonably think to adopt certain types of pay-for-performance incentives provided that they have clear and measurable objectives that support performance differentiation. Nevertheless, we suggest that most SEs should not use pay-for-performance incentives. Then, what can they do in order to motivate their workers to provide maximal efforts and consistent behaviors with the organizational social mission?

SE and the emergence of implicit incentives

Above-mentioned arguments correspond to explicit incentives (enforceable contract which defines the conditions under which the reward is provided like wage and monetary bonuses, promotion and even threat of job loss), but according to Merchant, Van der stede & Zheng (2003), implicit incentives can occur too. Implicit incentives are not explicitly and contractually defined; they are more perceived as “relational contracts” or psychological contracts (Argyris, 1960; Rousseau, 1995). Such incentives are based on trust in receiving some kind of reward for the effort given and not on a contractual relationship. If we apply such broader vision of incentives, it is quite clear that incentives would be present in SEs even if they do not use formal performance mechanism or others related explicit incentives. Indeed, implicit incentives seem to usually exist in SE (Devaro & Brookshire, 2007)⁹, and that for two reasons.

⁹ Importance of psychological contract in SE, especially the ideological form (Thompson & Bunderson, 2003), has been recently demonstrated (Roman, Battistelli, & Odoardi, 2014; Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Willems, Huybrechts, & Jegers, 2011).

First, workers who identify themselves with the values and norms defended by their organization's social mission are already motivated to perform well in order to help the others. While pure extrinsically motivated workers in an FPO with no incentives schemes are not supposed to be motivated to give extra efforts (except to keep their job) because they cannot gain extra rewards by doing so, pro-socially motivated workers hired in an SE have to give some efforts if they want "to make the difference." In other words, the answer to extrinsic motivation is given by monetary rewards while the opportunity to work for a mission in which they believe is the appropriate answer to give to prosocial motivation. Having a social mission that motivate workers for itself and implementing monetary incentives are then considered as substitutes (Besley & Ghatak, 2005).

Second, Mosca Musella and Pastore (2007) highlight the role of implicit incentives that can be played by the trust-based relationship (with all the stakeholders) in SEs. Such relational goods enable employees to experience their work as important and meaningful (Barry & Crant, 2000; Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000; Frey, 1997) but also provide a kind of implicit incentive: the more a worker produces (appropriate) efforts in the organization, the higher is the quantity of relational goods he obtains¹⁰. Hence, these external and internal relationships incite the workers to make a positive difference in the lives of all stakeholders (Grant, 2007). Mission-congruent behavior can, for example, be rewarded by the approbation of superiors, by social recognition and esteem of colleagues, or even by increasing self-esteem. Then, even behaviors not observable by managers can be rewarded on the condition that: "*coworkers (and the individual) have internalized mission-related behavior as a moral principle or norm (...) and understand (and agree) how different tasks contribute to promoting the overall mission*" (Speckbacher, 2013, p.14).

In conclusion, the matching between organizational and individual values decreases the likelihood for deviant behaviors (Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011). In other words, matching principals and agents on desired mission would increase efficiency without using high-powered incentives (Atwater & Dionne, 2007). On the one hand, these arguments suggest a lesser necessity to use explicit incentives in SEs than in FPOs (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; Besley & Ghatak's, 2005; Gerhards, 2013). This gives a competitive advantage to SEs present in market characterized by high asymmetric information where it is complicated to implement efficient explicit or monetary incentives (Mosca Musella & Pastore, 2007). On the other hand,

¹⁰ Research conducted on social networks indicates that interpersonal relationships may have a positive effect on work motivation but also on opportunities and resources at work (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Bandiera, Barankay & Rasul, 2010).

they also emphasize the importance of a good match between workers prosocial goals and organization's mission to achieve a better effort and output (Besley & Ghatak, 2005). The real challenge for SEs is then to attract and select people who best match the organization (Besley & Ghatak, 2005) but not to limit themselves to this. Indeed, SEs also have to develop practices that continuously direct, support and strengthen the matching through prosocial goals and a common understanding of each task's contribution to the overall mission achievement (e.g., Speckbacher, 2003), to ensure that implicit incentives are working properly. Grant (2007) underlines that aside from selecting people with calling orientation and altruistic values, it is also important to identify what practices managers may use to sustain their prosocial motivation to fulfill the organization's mission.

6. What practices SEs may use to sustain and strengthen their workers' autonomous prosocial motivation?

How SEs might improve the prosocial motivation of their workforce?

Research conducted by Grant (2007) show that prosocial motivation emerges through the experience of two psychological states: Affective commitment to the beneficiaries and the perceived impact of one's work on these beneficiaries (task significance). Indeed, both behavior-outcome contingencies ("perceived impact") and valuing the outcomes ("affective commitment") are critical in directing, sustaining and energizing the motivation (Staw, 1977; Vroom, 1964). The author identifies two practices that may have a positive impact on prosocial motivation through these two states: contact with beneficiaries and social information. He defines the contact with beneficiaries as the degree to which a job is relationally structured to provide opportunities for employees to interact and communicate with the people affected by their work. Without contact with beneficiaries, workers may have some difficulties to be aware of customer expectations and specifications (Hackman, 1990) and to see clearly how their efforts at work affect these beneficiaries. Conversely, if workers have the opportunity to interact with beneficiaries, feedback about their impact is provided by the beneficiaries themselves. This feedback, either positive or negative, confirms to workers that their work has the potential to affect beneficiaries (Grant, 2007). Further, Grant shows that the contact also positively affects the workers' affective commitment on beneficiaries. Without contact, even the most significant impact is impersonal and indirect while a job that is embedded in interpersonal relationship with beneficiaries can enable workers to care about

them. In definitive, contact with beneficiaries influences positively affective commitment to beneficiaries and perceived impact which in turn affect positively their prosocial motivation. In addition to the contact with beneficiaries, Grant highlights that social information about beneficiaries moderates the effect of contact on affective commitment to beneficiaries. In particular, social information about beneficiaries communicated by organizational and occupational ideologies affect the workers' reactions by shaping the ways in which workers evaluate the beneficiaries' beliefs, behaviors, group membership, etc. In conclusion, SEs have some interest, on the one hand, to foster the contact between their workers and the beneficiaries and, on the other hand, to provide positive social information about the beneficiaries through organizational and occupational ideologies in order to sustain and strength their workers' prosocial motivations.

How SEs might improve the autonomous prosocial motivation of their workforce through increasing their perceived PO fit?

In addition, we have shown that favoring perceived PO fit is also crucial for SEs in order to favoring the intensity of the prosocial motivation of their workers,. Indeed, and as mentioned before, the more workers' altruistic values fit in with the values of the organization, the more autonomous (and therefore efficient) will be the regulation of worker's prosocial motivation. This is even more important when we take into consideration that value congruence predicts job satisfaction, organizational commitment, job tenure and global performance (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson ,2005; Verquer, Beehr, & Wagner, 2003). Hence, the extent to which SE workers support their organization is closely related to the extent to which they perceive a high fit between their altruistic values and the organization's values (Valentinov, 2007).

The organizational justice climate is an important factor in order to sustain and improve workers' perception of values congruence with their organization. Indeed, it seems really important that SE employers are perceived as fair in order to develop and sustain workers' motivations in SE (e.g., Leete, 2006) through improving of the feeling of identification and congruence with the organization A fair climate provides good conditions to align goals of workers and those of the organization through managers (Korsgaard and Sapienza; 2002). Conversely, the unfair treatment of workers may induce a distortion of the relationship quality between workers or/and with leaders and managers. Another strategic importance of implementing a fair climate is because it improves the acceptance of a lower wage level

(Greenberg, 1990) that is usually the case in SE. Beside all these aspects, it has been empirically shown that people attract by SEs valorize fairness at work (Borzaga, 2009; Salim Sadruddin & Zakus, 2011) and desire an employer who is committed to fulfill social responsibility and to promote employee diversity (Lewis & Ng, 2013). We are then able to suggest that SE should develop an equitable work environment if they want to favor their workers' trust and commitment toward the organization (Salim, Sadruddin, & Zakus, 2012), as well as maintaining their perceived fit with the organization's mission and values. Developing a fair climate means implementing fair procedures and interactions as well as fair distribution of material and non-material rewards (Cropanzano, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007; Gilliland, Steiner, & Skarlicki, 2003, 2015). Indeed, linking principal-agent theory and organizational justice theory, Korsgaard and Sapienza (2002) suggest that when principal implements governance's mechanisms (controls, monitoring, and compensation) through fair procedures and interactions, agent's perceived fairness, trust and cooperation would be improved (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). In SEs, implementing a fair and equitable work environment (e.g., Mirvis & Hackett, 1983) means implementing fair decisions and procedures regarding resource distribution, rules and policies that affect employees, treating employees with respect, and involving them in decision-making. In particular, fair wages or wage equity perception regarding gender, race and age seems really an important signal for SE workers to perceive fair treatment from employers (e.g., Leete, 2000, 2006; Pennerstorfer & Schneider, 2010; Rabin 1998). Fair wage can be interpreted as either a limitation of wage dispersion or insuring that wage reward the merit (to pay in proportion of the output). As it has been demonstrated above, a pay-for-performance system has not often its place in an SE, except if some restrictive conditions are met (see above). Moreover, according to Lazear & Shaw (2007), pay compression may produce higher productivity through greater teamwork, and reduce risks of denigrating coworkers. Hence, we suggest that, most of the time, SEs have maybe more interest in using pay compression to sustain their workers' motivations; if this strategy induces also an increasing of the lower wages and not only a decreasing in upper wages.

So far, we have conceptualized person-environment fit as depending mainly on the dispositional characteristics of workers (i.e. personality and values) that guide their job choices. However, fit could also emerge through socialization, which is a dynamic of mutual exchange between workers and their organizational environment (Schneider, 1987). Socialization then sheds light on a classic debate: fitting in versus making people fit

(Kammeyer-Mueller, 2007). Moreover, organizational socialization systems predict role clarity (Ashforth & Saks, 1996; Kammeyer-Mueller & Wanberg, 2003), while it is crucial, in any kind of organization, to sustain a good understanding of each task's contribution to the overall mission achievement in order to ensure that workers' efforts are well oriented and to avoid deviant behavior. This is even more important in SEs because it is essential to ensure the effectiveness of implicit incentives (see above).

One of the best ways to improve socialization is through mentoring practices (Chao, Walz, & Gardner, 1992; Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1993). SEs' leaders have notably to give feedbacks to their workers about their performances in order to identify together development opportunities. A positive and egalitarian subjective evaluation of workers performance provided by supervisors or mentors allows the creation of positive relational goods as implicit incentives (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994) and to develop a good fit (Feij, Whitely, Peiro, & Taris, 1995; Kammeyer-Mueller, 2007; Ostroff & Kozlowski, 1992). According to Becker, Antuar & Everett (2011, p.267), *“The support of senior management, coupled with the genuinely consultative nature of development and implementation, and commitment to ongoing refinement based on feedback, facilitates a higher level of ownership, commitment, and, ultimately, accountability for all employees.”*. Thus, looking for creating a best fit between leaders and members (workers) would be also a way to maintain and improve fit between organizational and workers values as well as strengthening role clarity (Atwater & Dionne, 2007). Besides leaders, coworkers also assume an important role by providing explanations about formal and informal objectives and practices, thereby facilitating workers processes of socialization (Kammeyer-Mueller & Wanberg, 2003; Morrison, 1993). We propose then that mentoring practices and interactions with colleagues improve the PO fit through a socialization process and allow a better understanding of the behaviors and outputs that are valorized by the organization.

The “Economie Sociale” approach (Defourny & Develtere, 1999) and the EMES International Research Network approach of SE (Defourny & Nyssens, 2011) highlight the importance of democratic participative governance in SE. In particular, participative governance means democratic decision process in the general assembly and in the board (one person = one vote) and highlight the importance of the representation or the participation of the stakeholders (users, workers, donors, etc.) in the decision process. Hence, formal, but also informal, workers' participation is a practice often related to SEs. SE workers are then supposed to usually have the possibility to give their opinions and advices about important

issues for the organization (e.g. in the general assembly of members, in board of directors, or in group meeting). This participative management has been shown to induce positive motivation among the SE workforce (Borzaga & Tortia, 2006; Cawley, Keeping, & Levy, 1998; Lawler, 1990) and to favor a good adequacy in the long run between workers' (and all stakeholders') values and those defended by the organization (Lee & Bang, 2012), and that for three main reasons. First, participative management practices favor the process of socialization that allows making employees fit with the organization's mission. Second, important decisions and the future orientation of the firms may be influenced by the workers' opinions or decided collectively and have then more chance to fit with the workers' values. Finally, managers and leaders are particularly critical in keeping the SE's mission and ideology alive, and *"It is possible that with age, the purpose of the organization, its vision, and the idealism that held its members together may become diluted as leadership changes"* (Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011, p. 302). The participation procedure would reduce the possibility for leaders to deviate from the original mission without the stakeholders' agreement and then preserve from the potential negative effects of that shift on workers' PO fit. In particular, a participative work environment is preserved from the adoption of practices belonging to the for-profit sector without any adjustment regarding SE specificities and missions (Cheverton, 2007). Beyond favoring the person-organization fit, we propose that participatory and high-involvement management would also favor a common understanding of the objectives of the organization and of the behavior to adopt and to attain those objectives.

How SEs might improve the autonomous prosocial motivation of their workforce through increasing their intrinsic motivation?

Finally, another solution to favor the autonomous regulation of prosocial motivation is to sustain and reinforce the intrinsic motivation of their workers. Indeed, Grant (2008) found that workers experience prosocial motivation as a form of autonomous regulation when intrinsic motivation is high, but they tend to experience prosocial motivations as a form of introjected regulation when intrinsic motivation is low. Thus, it seems like different combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation are possible, but the best one to ensure the highest persistence and performance at work in SE would be an intrinsic motivation to do tasks associated with an autonomous regulation of the prosocial goal. This statement is in accordance with SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010) that highlights that high performance in terms of quantity and quality standards is reached when goals are autonomously regulated (i.e. an identified or integrated regulation of

the motivation) and tasks are performed with pleasure (i.e. an intrinsic regulation of the motivation). To conclude, we are not postulating that SE workers have more intrinsic motivation than their counterparts in FPOs, but that SEs have more interest than FPOs to favor the intrinsic motivation of their workers because it is positively correlated with autonomous prosocial motivation.

To improve workers' intrinsic motivation, it is possible to act at job level by designing job's characteristics that have motivational consequences. For instance, Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson (2007) in a large meta-analysis showed that task characteristics—such as task identity, autonomy, skill variety—predict internal motivation (as well as job satisfaction). Nevertheless, the strength of a particular job characteristic on intrinsic motivation would depend on the worker's preferences. Thus, in order to increase intrinsic motivation in SEs, managers should take into account PJ fit related to job characteristics when they recruit and select candidates but also when they manage and regulate workers' motivation. Empirically, it has been proved that job characteristics that favor intrinsic motivation are often present in SE and that they are valorized by their workers. Studies by Benz (2005) and Mosca, Musella and Pastore (2007) conclude that if the third sector workers are more satisfied with their jobs than their counterparts, it is also due to the presence of non-monetary benefits. Lanfranchi and Narcy (2008) and Borzaga and Tortia (2006) show that greater autonomy, less repetitive work, and the nature of the work contribute to explain why SE workers are more satisfied. Mirvis and Hackett (1983) also showed empirically that these SE workers access to more autonomy and a greater variety of tasks than FPO workers.

7. Conclusion

The above literature review has highlighted a lack of complementarity and homogeneity between the different studies which discuss and analyze work motivation in SE context. Based on psychological and economics literature and on recent works dedicated to SE, we consider the content of the motivation to work in SE is prosocial (e.g., De Cooman et al., 2011; Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008). Pro-socially motivated workers are attracted in SEs because their altruistic values are fitting with values defended by the organizational social mission (e.g., Besley & Ghatak, 2005). The self-determination theory allows for understanding that prosocial motivation may be based on different type of extrinsic regulation (introjected–identified–integrated) but not on intrinsic regulation (e.g., Grant, 2007;

Speckbacher, 2013). In other words, prosocial motivation may be a controlled or an autonomous motivation regarding its type of extrinsic regulation. The autonomous regulation of the prosocial motivation has to be fostered because it leads to various benefits from the quality and quantity of the work done. (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005). Finally, we suggest that a high autonomous regulation of pro-social motivation emerges when there is a strong match between workers' values and organizational values (i.e. PO fit) and when they are intrinsically motivated to perform their task (Grant, 2008).

Benefiting from pro-socially workers who perceive a high PO Fit is a central issue for SEs for three reasons. First, it is one of their main competitive strengths in a market (e.g., Steinberg, 1990, 2006; Valentinov, 2007). Indeed, the labor donation theory highlights that SE workers (especially managers and professionals) are ready to work for lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs (e.g., Preston, 1989) because they find that working for a social mission in SEs is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working in FPOs (e.g., Lewis, 2010; Light 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). Second, this particular workforce is essential for the successful functioning of most SEs (Hansmann, 1980; Handy & Katz, 1998) because the SEs difficulty to build quantifiable and meaningful measures of performance negatively affects the applicability of explicit incentives while the specificities of their workers' motivations and the trust-based character of the relationship between all the stakeholders increase the role played by implicit incentives (Speckbacher, 2013). Third, and beyond the effort's intensity, the direction of it is also crucial. Indeed, it is important that workers believe in (and understand) the organization's mission to behave in a coherent way with that mission. Therefore, most SEs have to rely on pro-socially motivated workers who perceive a congruence with the organizational mission.

The challenge for SEs is then how to attract and select a pro-socially motivated workforce who best fits with the organization's mission. First, SEs may favor perceived organizational fit of this workforce by displaying information about organization's mission. Second, they should implement practices that favor the PJ fit by answering to non-monetary preferences of their pro-socially motivated workforce. Regarding the selection issue, offering lower wages than FPOs would be a way to bring people to self-select themselves in the right organization. The more a worker is matching with the organizational social mission, the more he is ready to "sacrifice" a certain amount of wage. Hence, if SEs offer lower wages than FPOs, highly pro-socially motivated workers would still prefer SEs that better fit with their

altruistic values than FPOs, while less pro-socially motivated workers would choose another type of organization (Lewis & Frank, 2002).

However, it is certainly not enough to correctly select people who present the best fit regarding values in order to obtain the highest motivation and performance at work. It is also important to maintain and to favor the intensity and the autonomous regulation of prosocial motivation. Actually, any enterprise must ensure that its workers adopt consistent behavior with its mission (e.g., Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006), either by controlling or by encouraging their efforts. Regarding SEs, developing practices that sustain and favor workers' prosocial motivation growth is necessary since it is not always easy to attract people with values and motivation in perfect adequacy with the organization's mission (e.g., Devaro & Brookshire, 2007). Besides, it is important to prevent psychological contract failure which may have very particular negative consequences on workers' motivations and performance in SEs (Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Willems, Huybrechts & Jegers, 2014). A work environment that promotes maintenance or/and development of an autonomous prosocial motivation is characterized by: contact (direct and indirect) with beneficiaries, accessibility to information about the mission and beneficiaries, motivational job characteristics (such as autonomy, skills variety, task identity and significance, etc.) and positive organizational climate (recognition and organizational support, democratic participation and involvement in the decision process, and fair practices). Nevertheless, the literature put forward that all SEs should not be perceived as one equivalent entity; there exists some heterogeneity between SEs (Theuvsen, 2004), which may imply different management issues.

Proposition for future research

This review of literature makes the point about work motivation related to management issues in an SE context. Nevertheless, a greater number of empirical investigations are still necessary. First, no study has yet distinguished the selection effect from the exposition effect. Longitudinal studies are then required to dissociate those two effects that explain the presence of a more pro-socially motivated workforce in SE. Are SE workers more pro-socially motivated because they have a different motivational profile than workers attracted in FPOs or because they are influenced by their work context? Are these two explanations complementary? Second, empirical studies are needed to understand the different motivational dynamics between high qualified and low qualified staff. Indeed, the literature supposes that only highly qualified workers would be more pro-socially motivated in SEs than

in FPOs but empirical proofs are lacking. Motivational studies that rigorously control for workers' (or tasks') level of qualification in order to compare low and high qualified situation in SEs are then expected. Third, the link between practices and autonomous prosocial motivation through perceived PO and PJ Fit in the SE context has to be reinforced in future research. Studies analyzing the influence of incentives and managerial practices on worker motivation in the SE context has to be conducted in the future. Finally, future research should focus on the link between the specificities of SEs workers' motivation and their well-being, loyalty, effort and performance.

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